Trade-Based Money Laundering: How It Works, Red Flags, and How to Detect It
Trade-based money laundering (TBML) disguises the proceeds of crime and moves value through trade transactions to make it look legitimate. Launderers misstate the price, quantity or description of goods, invoice one shipment more than once, or document shipments that never happen. Banks see the documents and payments, not the goods, so detection depends on reading the document set, the payment and the customer file together.
What is trade-based money laundering?
Trade-based money laundering (TBML) hides criminal value inside ordinary trade: an invoice priced far from the goods, a shipment billed twice, a payment from a company that has nothing to do with the deal. The FATF's 2006 study defined it as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origins. Its 2008 best practices paper widened the concept to include terrorist financing. FATF named TBML in that study as one of the main methods criminal organisations and terrorist financiers use to move money and disguise its origins. The other two are use of the financial system and the physical movement of money, for example through cash couriers.
A red flag only helps if the bank can see it, and a trade finance bank never sees the goods. FinCEN put it plainly in its 2010 TBML advisory: financial institutions see only the documents related to a transaction and not the goods themselves. The same advisory warned that the documents may be created by the money launderers themselves, with no neutral third party to verify them. This page asks a narrower question than "what is TBML?" It asks which red flags show up in what the bank really holds (documents, payments and its own customer file) and what the team should do when they appear.
TBML is still an active threat. The U.S. Treasury's 2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment notes that professional money laundering methods often involve TBML techniques. FinCEN's Chinese money laundering network advisory of August 2025 warns that these networks may use complex TBML schemes to launder cartel funds. Its trend analysis counted 512 Bank Secrecy Act reports in its dataset that referenced TBML, totalling about $9.7 billion in reported suspicious activity. On 1 October 2026, FinCEN's alert on the A7 Network described that network's use of front companies as a form of TBML built on falsified trade documents, false import-export records and misleading goods descriptions.
This page draws on those FinCEN publications, the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) guidance paper prepared with Hong Kong Monetary Authority input, and the best practices paper from Singapore's AML/CFT Industry Partnership (ACIP), as they stood on 1 November 2026. It isn't legal advice. The reporting rules that apply to you depend on your jurisdiction. For a short answer, see what is trade-based money laundering.
How does trade-based money laundering work?
Most schemes misstate one of four things: the price, the quantity, the description of the goods, or whether a shipment exists at all. FinCEN describes the basic schemes as misrepresenting the price and quantity of goods and services, and invoicing the same goods or services more than once. The HKAB paper lists six typical techniques.
| Technique | How value moves | What the bank can check |
|---|---|---|
| Over-invoicing | The seller bills above fair market price and receives extra value from the buyer | Unit price against a market reference and the customer's past trades |
| Under-invoicing | The seller bills below fair market price and transfers value to the buyer | The same comparison, read the other way |
| Over- or short-shipping | The quantity shipped differs from the quantity invoiced | Units, weights and descriptions across the document set |
| Fictitious trade | No goods ship, but the documents say they did | Whether a valid transport document exists |
| Shell or front companies | A party with no real operations hides who is behind the flow | Owners, addresses and links between buyer, seller and payer |
| Multiple invoicing | One shipment is invoiced more than once to justify extra payments | Invoice numbers, dates and amounts across products and banks |
Over-invoicing and under-invoicing run in opposite directions. By invoicing above the fair market price, the seller receives value from the buyer. That's why a price check has to look at both ends of the range.
The schemes usually need the buyer and seller to cooperate. The HKAB paper says TBML techniques generally rely on collusion between the seller and buyer. In some cases, both are controlled by the same person. A check that treats the counterparty as an independent stranger misses that. Hidden ownership links are also why TBML overlaps with shell company sanctions evasion and with round-tripping.
The harder schemes come with clean paperwork. In the black market peso exchange, drug dollars in the United States are sold to Colombian businesses that want to buy U.S. goods for export, in exchange for pesos already in Colombia. The HKAB paper describes the general pattern, where domestic funds pay for goods on behalf of a foreign importer, and notes that in such cases there may not be any fraudulent documents involved. An under-invoiced trade can also leave a balance that is settled outside the banking system, which is where TBML meets hawala and other informal value transfer.
FinCEN's 2014 advisory added funnel accounts: an account in one area receives many cash deposits, often below the cash reporting threshold, and the money leaves from somewhere else. Mexico-based criminal organizations were using funnel accounts to finance the purchase of goods as part of TBML. The Treasury's 2024 assessment describes drug proceeds used to buy cellphones in bulk, which were then smuggled into Mexico and sold at an inflated price. FinCEN's 2025 trend analysis says TBML involving cell phones and electronics is a widely used method for Chinese money laundering networks.
What can a trade finance bank see?
What a bank can detect depends on how the trade is financed. The ACIP paper separates two cases. In documentary trade, such as letters of credit, the bank has information on the transaction and the parties involved. In open account trade, the bank may not receive the underlying documents and may have little information on the transaction or the parties.
Open account is most of the market. The ACIP paper says the majority of world trade finance transactions are carried out under open account terms. Unless the bank provides credit, its involvement may be limited to the clean payment, and it might not know the reason for the payment. It then might not be able to run checks beyond standard AML and sanctions screening on that payment.
| Trade type | What the bank usually holds | What it can realistically detect |
|---|---|---|
| Letter of credit | Invoice, transport document, packing list, certificates, the credit and its amendments | Price, quantity and description mismatches, odd transport documents, route and party issues, amendments |
| Documentary collection | The documents passing through for collection | Document mismatches and party screening, with less control over terms |
| Open account with financing | Invoices or receivables submitted for financing | Invoices financed twice, invoices that don't fit the business, related-party and circular trades |
| Open account, payment only | The payment message | Payment and account behavior against the customer profile, plus sanctions screening |
A letter of credit gives the bank the most to work with. In the flow the HKAB paper describes, the seller presents the documents to the nominated bank, which checks them against the credit before they move on to the issuing bank. The issuing bank then presents the documents to the buyer for payment. The goods travel outside that chain, which is the part no bank in it sees directly.
Who counts as the customer shifts with the bank's role. For the issuing bank, the customer would generally be the buyer. The HKAB paper warns that reasonably minor changes in facts can change who the customer is, so write down how you decide. A party that isn't your customer, such as the beneficiary of a credit you issued, still needs checking. That can include public sources and internet searches. Where the risk calls for more, that's enhanced due diligence on top of standard customer due diligence.
What should the bank know about a trade customer before the first trade?
Several of the party red flags above only work if the bank has written down what normal looks like for the customer. The ACIP paper says that for trade finance customers, including non-borrowing ones, the bank should add supplemental questions to its KYC or account opening form, and get the answers before onboarding to profile the customer and its expected transactions. The questions it lists include:
- the customer's business, the purpose of its trade activities, and the parties and countries it intends to deal with
- the typical volume and value or price of the goods, and their typical use
- whether the goods are subject to embargo or to export or import controls, or will end up transported or transhipped to a sanctioned country
- customary payment terms, and the parties that will make or receive payment where known
- the agents, shippers, freight forwarders or insurers the customer usually uses, and the reasons if related parties are involved
That profile is the reference point for later checks. Where a transaction or its documents depart from it, the ACIP paper says the bank should investigate the difference as part of its red flags assessment. The HKAB paper lists similar customer information, including major products, jurisdictions and markets, the delivery or transportation mode, major suppliers and buyers, and the expected methods and terms of payment.
The profile also goes stale. The HKAB paper notes that a customer's trade-related activities may change over the course of the business relationship, so CDD information should be updated. The ACIP paper says CDD information should be refreshed at periodic review or when there are significant changes to the customer's business and operations. A customer that starts trading new goods, through new corridors or with new counterparties is a reason to update the profile then, rather than wait for the next scheduled review.
TBML red flag matrix: invoice, shipment and party
The matrix below sorts the published red flags by where a trade finance bank would find them. It is our arrangement of indicators from FinCEN, HKAB and ACIP. The sources are cited in the sections that follow, and no single flag proves anything on its own.
| Where you look | Red flag | Compare it with |
|---|---|---|
| Invoice | Unit price far from fair market value | A market reference for the same goods and the customer's own past trades |
| Invoice | Vague goods description such as "metal", "electronic" or "chemicals" | The goods named in the credit and the transport document |
| Invoice | The same invoice presented for financing more than once | Invoices financed across every product in the bank |
| Invoice | Overly simplified product details, unlikely totals, odd dates or an unfamiliar invoice template | The customer's earlier invoices from the same supplier |
| Shipment | Goods described differently on the bill of lading, invoice and packing list | The other documents in the same set |
| Shipment | Containerised cargo with no container numbers, or sequential numbers | The bill of lading and the vessel's records |
| Shipment | Trans-shipment through jurisdictions for no economic or logistical reason | The route in the credit terms and the goods type |
| Shipment | A credit that doesn't call for a transport document, or an amendment that removes one | What the trade would normally require |
| Party | Payment from an intermediary unrelated to the buyer or seller | The parties named in the contract and the credit |
| Party | Buyer, seller or payer sharing an address or owner | Registry data and your own customer files |
| Party | A recently formed company with sudden high volumes of large transactions | Its stated business and expected activity |
| Party | A customer trading goods outside its business, such as a steel company dealing in paper | The customer profile and its trade history |
Invoice red flags
FinCEN lists significant discrepancies between the descriptions of the goods on the bill of lading, the invoice, or other documents. It also lists letters of credit amended without reasonable justification. The HKAB paper adds signs that goods descriptions are coded or disguised. The ACIP paper says a bank should have controls to detect whether the same invoice has been submitted for financing more than once within the same organization. It also says the bank should get clarity on general or vague wording in the description of goods, for example metal, electronic or chemicals.
FinCEN's 2026 A7 Network alert names document signs that a checker can test directly. They include documentation with overly simplified or vague product details, financially unlikely total prices or dates that don't make sense for the goods. Others are an analog "company stamp" on an otherwise digitally produced document and documents that appear to have been modified or wholly created using AI.
Shipment red flags
The HKAB paper flags a bill of lading that describes containerised cargo but without container numbers or with sequential container numbers. It flags a commodity trans-shipped through one or more jurisdictions for no apparent economic or other logistical reason. It also lists significantly amended letters of credit without reasonable justification, or changes to the beneficiary or location of payment. For shipments with high-risk jurisdictions or red flags, it says banks should run voyage and port checks to help confirm the existence of the shipment. The ACIP paper adds vessel checks to confirm the vessel travelled to the ports named in the documents.
Party and payment red flags
FinCEN lists third party payments for goods made by an intermediary apparently unrelated to the seller or purchaser. It also lists wires where no apparent business relationship appears to exist between the originator and the beneficiary. The ACIP paper flags transacting parties that appear to be affiliated or conduct business out of a residential address. It also flags a customer that deviates significantly from its historical pattern of trade activity. The HKAB paper's example of a profile mismatch is a steel company that starts dealing in paper products. It also flags a customer who is overly keen to waive discrepancies.
What FinCEN added in 2025 and 2026
Two recent FinCEN publications move the red flags beyond the letter of credit and into account behavior.
The August 2025 advisory on Chinese money laundering networks (FIN-2025-A003) has a separate list of red flags for TBML schemes linked to these networks. One is a business that regularly receives wires indicating the export of goods but rarely, or never, shows transactions that suggest it buys inventory. Another is a small U.S. business in electronics or real estate that receives wires from Mexico, China, Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates with no known nexus to those countries. A third is an electronics or luxury goods seller whose income is not commensurate with the size and scale of the business. These are monitoring signals, not document checks. They show up in payment and account data, which is often all a bank has in open account trade.
The October 2026 A7 Network alert (FIN-2026-Alert007) adds red flags for front companies that move value for sanctioned clients. They include payments routed through several potential shell companies in multiple jurisdictions for no clear economic purpose. They also include business documents whose goods descriptions don't fit the supplier's business profile. FinCEN notes that funds may move between several of these companies to add layers before arriving at the final destination. That is layering through trade, and it often runs through correspondent banking chains as well. For the correspondent side, see nested correspondent laundering.
Which goods and routes carry more risk?
Goods and routes add context to every other red flag. FinCEN's 2010 advisory warned that its red flags, seen together with shipments of high-value goods such as electronics, auto parts and precious metals to duty free trade zones, could indicate TBML or black market peso exchange activity. It named the Colon Free Trade Zone in Panama as an example. For how these zones are treated in AML programs, see free trade zones. The HKAB paper's list of vulnerable goods includes consumer electronics and home appliances.
Dual-use goods need specialist judgment. The HKAB paper notes that specialist knowledge is often required to determine whether or not goods have a dual use. A bank isn't an export control authority, but it needs a way to spot these goods and escalate them for review. That is where TBML work meets export controls and proliferation financing. Terrorist financiers use trade too, which is why the same controls support counter-financing of terrorism.
How should price checks work?
There is no single industry percentage that turns a price into a red flag. The HKAB paper suggests that banks perform price checks on a sampling basis. For goods without a usable market price, it says to make further enquiries where the pricing looks manifestly unusual. Its example is the pricing of a t-shirt.
Thresholds are each bank's own call. The HKAB paper says banks may wish to consider establishing acceptable price variance thresholds, which can differ by type of goods. For percentage-based red flags, each bank should consider the most appropriate percentages or other threshold that addresses the relevant TBML risk. If your policy quotes a "standard" deviation band without saying where it came from, treat it as an assumption to test, not a rule.
A useful price check compares the invoice with two things: a market reference for the same goods, and the customer's own past trades. A price far outside both is worth a question. A price that's unusual against the market but normal for a customer with a documented long-term contract may have an explanation. The HKAB paper says an anomaly may not necessarily give rise to, or elevate, the risk of TBML. Whatever the outcome, the ACIP paper says the bank should keep good quality records of the explanation and the decision to accept it.
Why do trade red flags get missed?
In our view, most misses come from what banks assume they can see rather than from a missing red flag list.
Monitoring built for cash accounts doesn't see the trade. The ACIP paper says it is difficult to employ standard patterning techniques in transaction monitoring for trade transactions. It suggests banks could adapt systems built for cash accounts to monitor transfers between trade accounts. A rule set copied from retail banking will see the payment leg and miss the trade. Our transaction monitoring glossary entry covers how scenarios, alerts and thresholds work.
The trade desk and the monitoring team work apart. The ACIP paper says the monitoring analyst should work with trade finance units to find TBML red flags. When the document checker sees a mismatch and the analyst sees an odd payment, nobody may connect the two.
Automation is treated as the control. The HKAB paper says automated systems should only act as a complement to human effort and judgment in trade monitoring. It also says Trade Controls should supplement automated screening with manual screening.
Red flags are reviewed one at a time. FinCEN says indicators should be evaluated in combination with other red flags and the customer's expected activity. Its 2026 alert repeats the point that no single red flag is determinative of illicit or suspicious activity. A checklist that clears each flag on its own merits can clear a case that should have been escalated.
Reports often don't say TBML. In its 2010 advisory, FinCEN found that filers clearly identified the activity as TBML or BMPE in only 24 percent of the SAR narratives it analyzed. It also found that 30 percent of suspected TBML activity from 2004 wasn't reported until the first half of 2009. The problem hasn't gone away: in 2025, FinCEN said it found TBML indicators in reports that didn't use the term at all.
Open account gets the letter of credit controls, or none. With only the clean payment to work with, a bank that relies on document checks has no TBML control for most of its volume.
What does this look like in practice?
The following scenario is illustrative. The bank, the importer and every figure are invented to show the process, not taken from a real case.
A trade finance bank issues letters of credit for a mid-sized importer of consumer electronics. A drawing arrives under a credit for tablets. Each document looks acceptable on its own. Read together, three things don't fit. The unit price is about three times what the importer paid on its last six credits for the same model. The bill of lading names a trans-shipment port that isn't in the credit terms. The margin deposit came from a company the bank has no record of.
- The document checker records the price gap and the port as discrepancies, each with the document and field it came from.
- A TBML specialist compares the price with the importer's history and a market reference, and checks the vessel's port calls.
- The specialist screens the third-party payer and finds it shares a registered address with the beneficiary.
- The relationship manager asks the importer about the price, taking care not to tip the customer off. The answer doesn't explain the gap.
- The compliance team reviews the file and refers it to the MLRO with every finding attached.
- The MLRO decides the case meets the reporting test, and the bank files a report that names TBML in the narrative. The customer's risk rating is reviewed.
None of the three anomalies would have been enough alone. The case exists because someone read the documents together and connected them to the payment and the counterparty.
How should a TBML alert be escalated and reported?
Escalation needs named levels and short lines. The HKAB paper's sample process has three.
- Level 1: trade processors who know the customer and international trade assess each transaction and escalate potentially suspicious ones.
- Level 2: staff with specialist TBML knowledge assess the escalation and make appropriate use of third-party data sources to verify key information.
- Level 3: a compliance or investigation team decides on further measures and whether a report is needed. Where there are unacceptable risks, the bank should not process the transaction.
Smaller operations are likely to require fewer stages of review. Reporting lines should have the minimum number of people between the staff with the suspicion and the MLRO. Trade specialists can help the MLRO assess a case, but in no circumstances may such staff filter out such reports.
Write the decision down. The ACIP paper says records of the escalation, the review, the rationale for the decision and the action taken should be kept for all stages. The HKAB paper asks for a written record of the fact of, and the rationale for, the release of an alert. If the bank gets a satisfactory explanation of the trade, it may conclude that there are no grounds for suspicion and take no further action.
The ACIP paper also sets a minimum for the work behind a decision on whether to file a suspicious transaction report. The bank should:
- review trade finance documents, such as bills of lading and commercial invoices
- run company verifications and media searches
- review the client's account activity
- review existing CDD information and, where needed, get information from the relationship management team
- review the results of any available screening and monitoring
- reassess the customer risk and adjust the risk rating if appropriate
The HKAB paper lists the same steps and adds that any contact with the customer has to bear in mind the risk of tipping-off. The last step matters even when no report is filed, because the review may show that the customer profile no longer matches the trade.
Filing rules depend on the jurisdiction. In Hong Kong, the HKAB paper says an STR should be filed with the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit where knowledge or suspicion arises. In the United States, a SAR is required where the institution knows, suspects or has reason to suspect that a transaction lacks a business or apparent lawful purpose, among other tests. FinCEN's 2025 advisory asks filers to select SAR field 36(l), Trade Based Money Laundering/Black Market Peso Exchange, where it applies. For activity linked to those networks, it asks filers to put the key term "CMLN-2025-A003" in SAR field 2 and in the narrative. Filers must keep a copy of the SAR and its supporting documents for five years from the date of filing. For narrative structure, see our suspicious activity report glossary entry.
For U.S. filers, timing follows the general SAR rule. FinCEN's SAR FAQs of October 2025 restate that a SAR is generally due no later than 30 calendar days after the institution's initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing. An institution may take another 30 calendar days to identify a suspect if none was identified at detection, but reporting must not be delayed more than 60 days after initial detection. In its 2010 advisory, FinCEN asked filers to include the abbreviation "TBML" or "BMPE" in the narrative of all relevant SARs, with an explanation of why the institution suspects, or has reason to suspect, that the customer is taking part in this activity. In our view, a narrative that names the documents, goods, route and parties behind that suspicion gives an investigator far more to work with than one that only calls the activity unusual.
Who decides what in trade finance TBML controls?
The guidance puts every decision that matters with named people. Trade processors escalate, specialists assess, the compliance team decides on further measures, and the MLRO decides on reporting. The HKAB paper also asks for a clear division of roles and responsibilities and ownership of risks for critical functions.
| Role | What it does | What it doesn't do |
|---|---|---|
| Trade operations (Level 1) | Checks documents against the credit and escalates potentially suspicious transactions | Decide whether a case is suspicious |
| TBML specialists (Level 2) | Assess escalations and verify key facts with third-party data | Filter reports away from the MLRO |
| Compliance team (Level 3) | Decides on further measures and whether to stop the transaction | Hand the reporting decision to a system |
| MLRO | Decides whether to file a suspicious transaction report | Delegate that decision to an AI agent |
| AI agents | Read and compare documents, screen parties, vessels and ports, and prepare the case | Decide a discrepancy under the credit, decide suspicion or file a report |
How FluxForce helps with trade-based money laundering
FluxForce is an Agentic OS for Regulated Industries. AI agents that investigate AML, sanctions, fraud and KYC alerts and prepare the case. Your analyst makes the call, with evidence an examiner can replay. You decide how much each agent does on its own, and every one has a kill switch.
Several of the misses above come from reading trade documents one at a time and keeping them apart from the payment and the customer file. FluxForce Transaction Monitoring is the solution for that work on a trade book. On the trade finance side, it's built to spot over- and under-invoicing, circular trades and invoices financed twice. The agents read the invoice, bill of lading, packing list and certificates together and pull out goods, quantities, prices, ports and parties. They compare prices with market references and routes with the credit terms, and they screen every party, vessel and port against sanctions lists. Each finding is shown with the document and field it came from. Over- or under-invoicing is flagged by comparing the invoice unit price with a market reference and with the customer's own past trades.
The agents prepare the case and your people decide it. Your trade operations team sees each discrepancy with its source, and compliance decides on escalation. Your document checkers decide whether a finding is a discrepancy under the credit. The full record is stored tamper-evident, so a supervisor or examiner can replay how the case was handled. Agents can draft STRs and SARs from the case evidence, but nothing goes to the FIU until your MLRO approves it. Medium-risk cases go to an analyst by default, high-risk cases always do, and you set the bands for each agent. The checks use FATF and Egmont Group guidance on TBML and the Wolfsberg Group, ICC and BAFT Trade Finance Principles. You can add your own red flags and switch any of them off.
Transaction Monitoring takes alerts from your existing monitoring system, with no rip and replace. It runs as SaaS, on-premise or hybrid. A trial starts in observation mode: the agents work live cases next to your team and don't clear, block or file anything while you compare their cases with your own. For the full trade desk view, see AI agents for trade finance. For how monitoring scenarios and alert review fit together, read our AML transaction monitoring guide.
Fit and limits: FluxForce doesn't see the goods. Its findings are only as good as the documents, payment data and reference sources it can read. A scheme with clean paperwork, like some black market exchanges, may still need an investigator's judgment and law enforcement information. A market reference price is a comparison, not proof of a fair price. For open account payments with no documents, the agents can only work with the payment, the account history and the customer file. FluxForce doesn't decide whether a document complies with a credit, doesn't decide suspicion and doesn't file reports. We don't publish accuracy numbers from demos. We'll measure the change on your own cases instead.
Next steps
Bring one letter of credit your team argued about. We'll run it through the agents and show you every finding, the screening behind each party and the point where your team takes over. See trade document checks. Before that, check three things in your own program: that your TBML controls reach open account trade, that your price variance thresholds are written down with a reason for each, and that every released trade alert has a recorded rationale.
How FluxForce detects trade-based money laundering
FluxForce AI agents monitor trade-based money laundering-related patterns in real time, surface red-flag activity for analyst review, and produce evidence-backed decisions with full audit trails.














